

Hana N. Hlaváčková

Whose Security? V4 States at a Crossroad between EU and NATO*

Abstract. States of Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) are part of community that fights against terrorism. This activity is not optional. Differences in views with whom to fight can be observable. EU established missions to secure EU territory and fight terrorism as a side effect of fragile states (EUNAVFOR Med Sophia, EUNAVFOR Somalia), however V4 states are not so active in those missions. On the contrary NATO also performs anti-terrorism missions, where the V4 states are more active. In this article author is applying role theory (one of recognized direction of foreign policy analysis) to show what role V4 states perform towards EU and NATO in the questions of fight against terrorism. Role theory enables the study of political discourse around areas that create particular roles. Roles result from foreign policy analysis. The second aim is to give an explanation of their (non-)participation in active involvement in the general in the fight against terrorism within the EU, or NATO.

Key words: EU, NATO, role theory, terrorism, V4 states.

© **Hana N. Hlaváčková** – Ph.D, works as an assistant professor at the Metropolitan University Prague at the Department of International Relations and European Studies.
E-mail: hana.hlavackova@mup.cz

*This publication is the result of Metropolitan University Prague research project no. 68-02 'Territorial studies, Economy and International relations', which was conducted in 2019 under a grant from the Institutional Fund for the Long-term Strategic Development of Research Organisations.

Introduction

In this article, I would like to point out the particular roles of these countries in terms of the fight against terrorism and explain their differences towards the EU and NATO. States fight against terrorism to protect their basic features such as internal and external security. It includes also security of people, territory, boundaries and institutions. New trends of terrorism show that it is necessary to fight against terrorism due to its international (global) character. It should be states first choice to participate in the fight against terrorism.

After the destabilization in the Arab world after the so-called Arab spring, states in the region of North Africa failed and collapsed. This situation created new conditions for the spread of terrorism, especially concerning groups with a connection to Al-Qaida. However, terrorist organizations have mutated and split from Al-Qaida, especially the so-called Islamic State (or Daesh in the US). Destabilization of states influenced unsatisfied people with Arab revolutions and they have become radicalized and have joined IS.

The USA in 2014 called upon a Coalition to fight IS and all V4 states were included (together with other EU states, but the EU itself did not take any action). Terrorism is a new threat that the EU started to solve in a joint way after 9/11 2001 terrorist attack. Since that year radical Islamic terrorism became a new threat that is not possible to defeat it alone. It is hard to say whether terrorism is an external threat or internal threat to European security.

European security has been threatened by terrorism since the 1960s. However, acts of terrorism in that period were different — attacks by ETA or IRA were focused mainly on political or administrative targets. Islamic fundamentalism has changed the strategies of attacks and its goals. It has changed also strategies of recruiting and spreading the radical ideology. Those features have to be solved together and prevention of terrorism is the most useful instrument.

The European Union (EU) is an international organization consisting of 27 states that all prefer to fight against terrorism outside the EU. This opinion evolved from European security strategies (both for internal and external security) in 2003 (first European security strategy), 2005 (European strategy to combat terrorism), 2010 (EU Internal security strategy) or 2016 (EU Global strategy). This means that all member states on the ground of the European Council have declared that they will fulfill the ideas of the securing Europe, that all can be now seen as a fight against terrorism (internally or externally). Their interpretation of certain participation in this fight differs from state from state. According to their behavior, it would seem that the fight against terrorism is optional, because not all states participate in the same way. In some respects, small states in the EU are not very different from medium-sized and major European powers. The difference from France, Great Britain or Germany

is obvious — small states have not yet become a terrorist target. However, this does not mean that the threat of terrorism is not their problem. Even small EU states exist in an interdependent world, and therefore politicians should respond to this threat.

NATO is a security organization consisting of different states from great powers to small states across continents. After 1989 NATO has changed the definition of threat and started to send missions into wars. This has changed with 2001 terrorist attacks and the mandate of missions is focused on fight against terrorism (speaking about Afghanistan, Iraq, not all cases). The problem between NATO and EU is that the member states are overlapping. According to Berlin Plus Agreement from 2002, EU can use capabilities of NATO for its planned missions, followed by praxes that EU will not substitute NATO where NATO prefers to participate and EU can use management bodies for its missions. This attitude was confirmed in 2018 in Warsaw. This treaty was reasonable, because states, especially the smaller ones do not want to give arms expenditures twice. So when it comes to the questions of financing some activities, it is easier within NATO, because there is this one non-European supervisor who takes all the responsibility. For small states it is easier to participate without responsibility. However in the discourse of the V4 states we can observe a little notion of responsibility.

The successful fight against terrorism must be waged in two front lines. The first is inside Europe. Cooperation is carried out between information services, police, customs officers (in tracking suspicious persons), protection of important buildings etc. The other front line is active or passive support outside Europe. Active action means established missions, support in armament, lecturing, etc. The passive form of cooperation is also highly important in the fight against IS; passivity, however, could mean a lack of awareness in particular foreign policies of states.

Terrorism is a topic that the European Union fails to solve as a complex problem by the time. In the history of integration, we can observe the development of European securities — internal and external. In addition to this division, the EU still does not know whether security questions should be solved together or separately (i.e. on a supranational or intergovernmental level — more on this in Bauerová, Hlaváčková, Vošta 2018)¹.

1 Terrorism was classified as a threat to internal security, however, during a long period was observed that defeating terrorism is not possible only inside EU or member states. One of the new solutions since 2003 are EU missions inside unstable countries which should help stabilize the environment in the country. However, those missions are not the main action to fight IS. We can ask why? The reason is simple; there was no common action to send troops to Iraq or Syria. States did not find a common attitude so everyone solves it on his own.

In this article, I have put two research questions: (1) What are the limitations in V4 participation in the fight against terrorism in the EU and NATO framework? (2) What is the role that V4 states play towards EU and NATO? Main purpose is to show differences in the attitudes towards EU and NATO in the fight against terrorism and limitations that has occurred during years.

To follow the questions I have used as a theoretical framework role theory that is not a mainstream in foreign policy analysis, but is becoming more popular due to its effectiveness to help detect role(s) that particular state plays towards someone (or something). This role is consisting of expectations — internal and external, that are observable in speeches or interviews of policy makers. To explain the role of each state of V4.

Briefly to the structure of this article, firstly I will explain theoretical framework (role theory and different concepts of role with its typology according to Kalevi Holsti (1970) and Lisbeth Aggestam (1999). Secondly I will explain background of fight against terrorism and limitations inside EU that influence state's participation and form relationship with NATO. In the third part will be explained roles that each V4 state plays in the context of fight against terrorism within EU and NATO.

Theoretical framework²

There are several options concerning ways to study state behavior. In the context of theories of international relations, I interpret state behavior with constructivism, which is capable of uncovering state interests and, on the basis of main concepts — identity, norms of behavior, notions of power — show what is important for particular politicians.

With constructivism, we can speak about role theory as one method of foreign policy analysis. Role theory is rarely used theory as an analytical framework; however it has few advantages, for example pretty exact definition of role creation and role performance. In constructivism, role theory has been used (more detailed in Harnisch, 2014). Usually authors who use role theory are influenced by the concepts of language and identity. This brings us to problems of constructivism definition. The point is that, with constructivism, you do not have to use it as one theory — there is more than one version of constructivism and we can combine them as is done for example by L. Aggestam (1999), who combines rational positions of realism where foreign policy is based on the maximization of gains; however, a role itself is socially constructed. In role

2 This theoretical framework comes out from my dissertation thesis that focused on foreign policy analysis and relations towards particular states (more detailed see in Hlaváčková, 2017), however it is also possible to use role theory to observe relationship towards particular international organisations such as EU and NATO.

theory, such a combination can be useful. When we speak about states and especially about state security, rationality is an expected characteristic. Power is also an important concept in constructivism. In my research, roles are socially constructed and states learn roles according to rules inside institutions (NATO and EU), but they are rational.

We can name roles according to these specific relations and performance of actors. There is a connection between the process of role conception and external expectations. The role is then influenced by norms and values which the state accepts. According to Lisbeth Aggestam (2006), roles are constructed and accompanied by these characteristics: (1) Role expectations — can be external and internal. Internal expectations are formed by political culture, society, and politicians themselves. External expectations are formed by an institutional structure where the actor belongs. (2) National role conception — this is a normative interpretation of the actor. Conception is long-term and shows what possibilities and strategies an actor can play. It is formed by history, culture and societal characteristics. Role conception is linked to the concept of identity. Identity is a part of role conception and has influence on its form. Creation of role is part of social reality and is formed by external and internal actors. These actors create some expectations, which can form the role itself. In some cases, the role can be changed in time. This is connected with norm and ideational changes. This is called the process of socialization, which is very important for constructivists. (3) Role performance — is the actual behavior of the actor. It can be influenced by specific situations. The actor plays its role. (4) Role change — the role is a stable figure; it has to be consistent so politicians can fulfill it. The role can be changed in the context. The situation must be severe — political instability, change of norms, and speculation about the role.

K. Holsti showed 17 roles of states that can be played³. In these 17 types, there are some types which are not suitable for this time period (he created it during the Cold War) and some of the types are not suitable for small states.

3 This role typology was created in the Cold War, where partnership mattered. In this period of time, partnership also matters in terms of the fight against terrorism. When the role is called for example “developer”, we are dealing with a state that helps to stabilize fragile countries. Such a state needs to have prerequisites in the material base, such as finance or military power. The role of the independent player is important for the collective actor because this kind of actor will play on his own interests. He feels unbounded by rules and norms and cooperates with whoever he wants. Such types of roles exist in any context. A regional subsystem cooperator is an actor who supports ties and participates in mediation in conflicts. Such a state is open to commitments in the region. The ally prefers close cooperation and creates special relationships and strategic partnerships. A security promoter has responsibility and commitments towards the region and international security. In this typology, we can see the influence of realism, but also constructivism due to some roles that put pressure on norms, rules, and perhaps also collective identity.

The list includes types of roles according to responsibility, i.e. whether such a state prefers to be responsible or not. Perception and performance of responsibility is a key feature for actors who are or are not reliable and credential.

In this article, research was carried out with qualitative methodology via critical content analysis. In the four selected cases (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) I have focused on discourse created by politicians, mainly decision makers. I have analyzed their speeches and interviews and according to the words used, I have assigned them types of roles. The documents used were taken from official government websites from foreign ministries. It is possible to find them in list of references under name data corpus. At first glance, it was not visible what roles they play; with deeper research, however, it became clear what the roles of the V4 are in the fight against terrorism in the context of EU and NATO. Above that I have searched for the reality, whether states participate on missions and if the words are not only empty promises.

Common action in the fight against terrorism: V4 within EU and NATO

The fight against terrorism in the EU holds a prominent position among security topics. Until 2001, not so many countries in the EU had experience in the active fight against terrorism. Only Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain were those who had operational bodies to fight against such a threat. Cooperation on an EU level to fight terrorism was not a priority, due to the significance of sovereignty, in which every state secures itself. Terrorism was a threat to internal security (Druláková, 2011: 63)⁴.

After 9/11, perception of terrorism has changed. European states decided to take part in the reaction (Action plan to fight terrorism from 2001 and Counter terrorism coordinator); however, the common action in the mean of common activity abroad of EU was not activated immediately, however NATO started mission abroad to defeat terrorism (in Afghanistan). Global terrorism showed no limits for terrorist attacks.

EU insisted on the idea that terrorism is still a matter of internal security; developed bodies (Europol, Eurojust) should fight against terrorism only on an intergovernmental level, e.g. only cooperation between states has emerged (Bendiek, 2011: 5). After these attacks, EU states proposed particular type of action (to reinforce American answer in Afghanistan by military power of joint EU action), however the only common EU action was a joint plan,

4 In the Maastricht Treaty, terrorism was dealt with in the third pillar on an intergovernmental level. However, when we look back, it could have been dealt with at any level of EU security, i.e. in each pillar (Zimmermann, 2006) due to the connection of particular topics of EU security.

which was hugely criticized as a wide-ranged plan with no proper deadlines or specific “to do’s” for collective bodies (Bossong 2008: 33). For V4 states, fight against terrorism outside EU is not so much effective. This is the reason why some states have decided to participate in the actions of other international organizations such as NATO or actions together with the USA. None of them wanted to remain inactive, because 9/11 showed that the EU is not excluded; terrorist cells were established in Europe as well and such kinds of terrorism do not respect borders (Keukeleire, Delreux, 2014: 152).

After the first massive action, states took part in international missions such as ISAF and created Provincial Reconstruction Teams to stabilize countries that inadvertently hosted terrorist organizations. Countries of the V4 also took part. However, it was not a common EU activity — the EU did not take part. It was NATO.

In 2014, more destabilized states have emerged in the European neighborhood. The EU had its chance to take action together in the case of Libya for example; however, after long discussions, the EU decided not to become involved in conflicts directly on EU borders, which was a huge mistake according to Engberg (2014). This passive attitude is typical for EU states when the threat does not concern them directly — this applies not only to V4 states, but all EU states. However, NATO took action in Libya. In this concrete conflict was cooperation between NATO and EU suggested, however Turkey stopped it due to its joining problems with EU (see more Bauerová 2018). This was again one evidence that NATO is capable to take action immediately when it is needed and there is not so much pressure to small states (V4) that they have to also participate.

EU’s lack of activity can come from: (1) EU strategic culture; (2) Post-heroic society; (3) Historical relations with EU states; (4) Fight for power inside the EU; (5) Internal relations and disputes within the EU 28; (6) Lack of one vision on missions and the EU role in world/region; (7) Non-existence of an EU army. All of those presuppositions together create the context of the EU’s lack of active action despite all the road maps and action plans (see more on this in Bauerová, Hlaváčková, Vošta, 2018).

Typically small states are more passive than EU powers, so we need to explore the reasons for this. The V4 is a group of states that are small (geographically and according to their power), except Poland, which is not small geographically but in terms of power can be considered a small state. We can give several explanations for why small states of the EU do not participate so often in missions or in other external actions at all, not only in the fight against terrorism abroad: (1) Small states are more vulnerable to populism. Political leaders are voted by citizens and in this reason politicians often cannot explain participation of army abroad in way citizens like. It is hard in small

states to uphold even states expenditures abroad. On the contrary, politicians have often different interests how to catch citizens using populist rhetoric. From this standpoint we can say that what is not in interest of politicians is not a hot topic and EU missions are not a topic in small states political or media debates. Small states, typically the V4, are young democracies and are easily vulnerable to “euro bashing” used by populist parties inside states. (2) We can also observe strong Euroscepticism in V4 governments. This can obstruct various actions. (3) Politicians are concerned about double standards within the EU so this creates a feeling of inferiority. This goes along with the underrepresentation in the EU’s external institutions such as EEAS EU headquarters. (5) A lack of resources to participate are arguments used by politicians. Later, I will point out discourses and arguments made by particular politicians to support these reasons for passivity and some reasons that push politicians to be more active in the field of securing Europe (more in Hlaváčková, 2018). None of these limits occur within V4 states and NATO.

In the table below, passivity can be seen in their participation in ongoing EU missions. Some of them deal with terrorism or its side effects; some do not, but I have not included all of them, only some to illustrate what missions (regions, topics) are attractive or not. In other missions V4 states do not participate.

Table 1: Participation of V4 in ongoing EU missions

Ongoing EU mission	Countries and their participation			
	CZ	PL	SVK	HUN
ALTHEA/BiH	Y	Y	Y	Y
EU NAVFOR Somalia	Y	N	N	N
EUAM Ukraine	N	N	N	N
EUMM Georgia	Y	Y	Y	Y
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia	Y	Y	N	Y
EUPOL COPPS	Y	Y	Y	Y
EUTM RCA	N	N	N	Y
EUTM Somalia	N	N	N	Y
EUTM-Mali	Y	Y	N	Y

Y – yes, state participates; N – no, state does not participate; number of deployed personnel when it is significant.

Source: author

This table shows some trends that V4 states usually participate. When we look more deeply, the numbers show us, that only Poland has sent more than a hundred troops. In other cases of V4 states, we can observe individuals who were deployed.

It should be mentioned that there are also motives and reasons that push states to participate. Those reasons can be seen in general, but each of them explains reasons for small states of the EU, especially the V4. Terrorism is a threat that can be decreased by missions or other external activity. This is linked to other reasons that push states into activity (and politicians are able to legitimize external action before society) – migration and migration flows. In this respect, it is also possible to help failed and destabilized countries, because they influence the security of V4 states (mainly financial resources).

However, the fight against terrorism is mainly an internal action with little cooperation externally. In 2013 the European Parliament shared a vision that, in order to deal with new threats (terrorism being the most serious), action should be taken together. Here, the main point was to combine tools for external and internal security (Bauerová, Hlaváčková, Vošta, 2018).

Table 2: Participation of V4 in ongoing NATO missions

NATO ongoing missions	CZ	PL	SVK	HUN
Resolute Support in Afghanistan	Y	Y	Y	Y
KFOR	Y	Y	N	Y
Sea Guardian in Mediterranean Sea	N	Y	N	N
NATO Mission Iraq	Y	Y	Y	Y
AU Mission in Somalia	N	Y	N	N
Air policing mission	Y	Y	Y	Y

Source: author

Participation in NATO missions in the context of fight against terrorism is more active. When in the EU missions participate individuals, in the NATO missions take part tens or hundreds (sometimes thousands) of troops (from each state) including specialized units such as chemist, field hospital and so on.

It is need to stress that in all V4 countries we can observe clear preference that V4 states send more troops under NATO command (for example in Hun-

gary it is 70% of all missions that are sent under NATO command⁵). In some countries like Slovakia or Hungary, second place is UN and later EU command. Poland from all four countries is always the leader under NATO command and sends most troops. It is also influenced by defense budget. Only Poland spend 2% of GDP, other only little more than 1% of GDP.

Roles of V4 states performed towards EU and NATO

Now, the main aim is to define roles that the V4 performs in the context of the fight against terrorism. I will show in more detail how the roles were constructed inside the states. Roles are constructed by politicians with external expectations, internal expectations, and interpretation of identity.

External expectations are constructed by other states and representatives of international organizations or the norms and rules within these organizations. Expectations are constructed by high-ranking politicians such as presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs and others. All V4 states have mentioned NATO as a leading organization. Under NATO's rules, states feel obliged to fulfill NATO's commitments. The Czech Republic wishes to fulfill expectations of a "good" NATO member. In Hungary politicians often mentioned NATO, however they also often mentioned "following US strategy". This has connotations with US President Trump, who has not criticized Hungary for its internal politics (contrary to the previous US President Obama). Polish politicians have reiterated that Poland wants to be a good (Western) ally and a good member of NATO. There was, however, a game being played here in the background concerning negotiations between Poland and the USA on the Eastern Partnership, where Poland promised to join the coalition if the USA takes part in stronger cooperation in Eastern Europe. Slovakia's politicians have mentioned that they feel a responsibility in the fight against terrorism and that the threats "also pertain to us". To sum up, it could be expected that all V4 states feel pressure to be part of the antiterrorist coalition. What is interesting is that no politician spoke about the EU as an actor to combat IS. All of them in the context of IS have made statements about NATO.

Internal expectations refer to what is expected from politicians, government, presidents and prime ministers and other ministers internally, i.e. inside the state. Internal expectations prevail in terms of what the country should do and why. On the contrary, such expectations also capture how others will react to particular activity. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia politicians said that it is "reasonable to be part of such a coalition" for the same reason as in Hun-

5 *Jandová D.* Military involvement of Visegrad Four. *European Security Journal*, available at: <https://www.esjnews.com/military-involvement-of-visegrad-four-in-foreign-missions> (accessed 11.07.2019).

gary, i.e. politicians expect the fulfilling of its international obligations. Polish politicians expected to be respected (by NATO members) when they participate in the fight against IS. It is understandable that small states (which are not in great danger) do not participate only because they would like to defeat terrorism, but also because they know that the international community (NATO) is waiting for their participation. It is also a good way to explain to their citizens the reason for their participation, using arguments like “it is expected of us” or “we need to fulfill our commitments to the international community.”

In the discourse of decision-makers is possible to observe reasons that cannot be separated from the construction of identity of each state. The analysis shows that fight against terrorism is not a part of identity and reasons vary from state from state. Politicians did not speak about the fight against terrorism as a norm or rule. The fight against terrorism can bring prestige; this was visible in Czech discourse. In Slovak and Polish discourse, I have the found the justification that the international community needed help to defeat the threat. In Poland, politicians spoke about responsibility. In Hungary, it was mentioned that terrorism threatens Christian values and that they need to be secured. Politicians in all five states mention different reasons. Czech politicians spoke about securing Europe and that participation is good. In the Czech case, it was also mentioned that aid is a good business because the Czech Army sold airplanes to the Iraqi army because those airplanes are at the end of their “expiration date”. The Czech government counts this “aid” in the total expenditure of donated aid. Hungary has experienced migration flows and took steps to stop it, and the fight against terrorism is one possible solution to this. In Poland politicians mentioned that partners (in the fight against terrorism) have suffered casualties and they feel the need to help these partners. In Slovakia, politicians speak of only one solution, which is humanitarian aid. These reasons justify their activity (or the lack thereof) in the fight against IS. However, there are also other reasons that politicians speak about their limits. Common to almost all five countries is that they are small countries with limited sources. We can hear politicians speak about “doing their best” in the fight against so called Islamic state. Responsibility is shuffled to the international community and other states. Only Poland was most active (due to a barter trade with the USA).

To detect a significant role towards EU, I had to divide the roles into smaller pieces, i.e. into a process that creates the role (parts above). To find proper roles, I used Kalevi Holsti’s table of roles and searched for the common activities of each state. Now it is possible to make some conclusions about the roles. The Czech Republic can be called a developer. Such a role is connected with stabilization and development of states who suffer terrorism (Iraq and Syria). The Czech Republic also surely plays the role of independ-

ent actor. This actor chooses whether it will join the action after assessing whether it is worthwhile or not. No one can count on such an actor. Hungary and Slovakia also play roles of developer and independent actor. Poland also performs the role of ally. This role does not take responsibility for an action, but Poland plays a role with a sort of responsibility; it can be called a promoter of security. Such a role means that this actor takes responsibility in the promotion of security in the countries or region. Other actors can count on it for help.

Roles played by V4 states towards NATO are slightly different but not so much. All of the V4 states performed the role of ally because politicians spoke about bonds to NATO that they have to participate. This is common for all observed states. Ally usually helps with the security protection of the region. With fight against terrorism V4 states should not be only allies. What is different is the second role. For example Poland and also Slovakia have spoken out about little responsibility which brings us to the role with responsibility – promoter of security. However promoter of security has to be a bigger player with a long-term activity. In this case I would not say that Slovakia is a promoter of security. In the Czech and Hungarian cases according to discourse in their countries, they are ally but also independent actors because they cooperate only sometimes and it is always big discussion if they will continue with support or not. With the fight against terrorism is easier for politicians to justify the participation in a bigger amount of troops deploying them in a long-term. Below in the table are summed the roles up.

Table 3: Role performance of V4 towards EU and NATO

State	Role performance	
	EU	NATO
Czech Republic	developer, independent actor	ally, independent actor
Hungary	developer, independent actor	ally, independent actor
Slovakia	ally (without responsibility), promoter of security (with responsibility), developer	ally
Poland	developer, independent actor	ally, promoter of security

Source: author

Participation in actions such as the fight against terrorism is driven by several factors. I have mentioned them above and I would like to stress some of them here. Small states usually consider NATO as a security provider (with the participation of NATO) and usually take some part in antiterrorist action.

This is a phenomenon that does not affect any of the V4 states internally, so it is very hard for politicians to justify participation abroad.

When the V4 participates, they are not vulnerable to duplicate such action in other organizations. The fight against terrorism (especially IS) struggles with EU internal constraints that relate to the process of any external security action. Most V4 politicians usually speak about the efficiency of such anti-terrorist actions; for them, more useful (i.e. related to each state) actions are carried out inside the state, not outside.

The fight against terrorism is related to the stabilization of failed states and it is a long-term process. Such a process is not favorable for politicians, because they need immediate changes to show voters their success. In regard to the capability of deployment of small states, some of them, to show the flag, participate; however, they have problems with army unit deployment because of capacity.

Each V4 member has other commitments in other missions and the (1) capacity of a small state is not endless so this is one of the reasons why they prefer NATO action. (2) Another reason is that there is always US support in NATO activity. In the discourse I have showed was clearly visible they prefer NATO (and US) support. This helps (3) their common strategy to participate only sometimes, called show the flag. Due to the reasons mentioned above regarding lack of persons, budgetary struggles and size of state. Sometimes there is also interplay of V4 states not to go against Russia's interest as it was visible in the Syrian case.

Concluding remarks

States of V4 group have to split their activity into two international organizations — EU and NATO. Since EU has its Common Foreign and Security Policy and since the threat of terrorism is growing even in Europe, it realizes different types of action in the fight against terrorism. In the security strategies was agreed by the member states that better to fight terrorism outside Europe. It is interesting, that V4 states participate, but with its limits. When we compare their involvement in NATO missions against terrorism, we can observe more deep participation and a way bigger number of sent troops.

In this article, I have put two research questions: (1) What are the limitations in their participation in the fight against terrorism in the EU framework? (2) What is the role of V4 states towards EU and NATO? To sum up the analysis, there are few facts that I would like to stress in the discourses of these four states. (1) All V4 countries call for common action and responsibility of the international community and do not feel significantly responsible for the fight against IS, with the exception of Poland, which is a special case. Poland has decided to play a more important role, and in its

discourse we can observe notions of responsibility. (2) V4 states link NATO and the fight against terrorism inside the Coalition against Terrorism together as one action. All states see the fight against terrorism as a commitment to the international community (NATO, not the EU). (3) States participate because partners of the international community are involved too. A strong reason to be a good member of NATO is visible here. (4) Other countries (not only Hungary) held discussions that the fight against terrorism, specifically IS should stop migrations flows that is strong argument towards their citizens. (5) Politicians also argue that military action has to go hand in hand with political solutions. And NATO has the strong experience specifically in Afghanistan and Iraq with reconstruction teams. (6) There are also visible material limitations.

Limitations of participation	
Nonmaterial	Material
Great powers take action and the responsibility; decisions are made by the great powers (within EU and NATO); lack of political will to be stronger supporter of missions; threats that do not significantly touch V4 states	V4 states are small in the size that brings material limitations: low budget, less personnel that can be deployed, less capability

To summarize, I think there is another reason that small states of the EU participate in the fight against terrorism: (7) They simply want to show their flag and gain prestige. If this were not true, they would help more than just by providing (humanitarian) aid or military support. They would actually participate (with the exception of Poland, which promised participation). However, small states and their politicians are conflicted when it comes to this topic, because military participation is not popular. Politicians could lose their support and maybe lose their jobs. But when should terrorism be defeated if not now? The fight against terrorism should not be optional.

For the EU, the non-participation of the V4 (except Poland) means that these states are not responsible in terms of European security and are not trustworthy. With the question of participation in NATO it is not hugely different. We can observe bigger amount of troop send, but when it comes to option, politicians see the participation as voluntary, not obligatory. The question is why there is not so much activity in the fight against terrorism and when it will be more suitable to participate? Why the states leave active participation behind?

The V4 states should not make their decisions based on what is or is not a viable topic for their citizens and voters, but instead think about European security. Another question is how to overcome the feeling of redundant activity (small states think that only the big states of the EU matter and leave the responsibility to the bigger ones or other organizations when it comes to security).

REFERENCES

- Aggestam, L. (1999). Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy. ARENA working papers, 99/08, Oslo, Centre for European Studies University of Oslo.
- Aggestam, L. (2006). Role theory and European foreign policy: a Framework of analysis, in: Elgström, O., Smith, M. (eds.) *The European Union's Roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis*. London, Routledge. pp. 11–29.
- Bauerová, H., Hlaváčková, H., Vošta, M. (2018). *Vnitřní a vnější dimenze bezpečnosti Evropské unie*. Libri/MUPPress. Praha.
- Bendiek, A. (2011). *At the Limits of the Rule of Law: EU-US Counter-Terrorism Cooperation*. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Paper. Berlin.
- Bossong, R. (2008). The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism: A Flawed Instrument of EU Security Governance. *JCMS* 46(1). pp. 27–48.
- Checkel, J. T. (2006). Constructivism and EU Politics, in: Jørgensen, K. E., Pollack, M. A., Rosamond, B.. *Handbook of European Union Politics*. London, Sage. pp. 57–76.
- Druláková, R. (2011). *Vnitřní bezpečnost Evropské unie. Prostor svobody, bezpečnosti a práva*. Praha: Oeconomica.
- Elgström, O., Smith, M. (2006). Introduction, in: Elgström, O., Smith, M. *The European Union's Roles in International Politics. Concepts and analysis*. Abingdon, Routledge. pp. 1–10.
- Engberg, K. (2013). *Ten Years of EU military operations*. European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
- Hlaváčková, H. (2017). *Role Slovinska v integraci zemí západního Balkánu. Analýza diskurzu slovinských zahraničně-politických aktérů*. MUP Press. Praha.
- Hlaváčková, H. (2018). Zajištění vnější bezpečnosti EU – komplexní přístup a mise, in: Bauerová, H., Hlaváčková, H., Vošta, M. *Vnitřní a vnější dimenze bezpečnosti Evropské unie*. Libri/MUPPress. Praha.
- Hollis, M., Smith, S. (1986). Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making. *British Journal of Political Science*. 16 (3). pp. 269–286.
- Holsti, K. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (3). pp. 233–309.
- Hopf, T. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security* 23 (1). pp. 171–200.
- Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T. (2014). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lynch, D., Missiroli, A. (nondated). *ESDP Operations*. Institute for Security Studies, available at: <http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/09-dvl-am.pdf>, (accessed 4.1.2015).

- Naxera, V.* (2018). The Never-ending Story: Czech Governments, Corruption and Populist Anti-Corruption Rhetoric (2010–2018). *Politics in Central Europe*. 14(3). pp. 31–54. DOI: 10.2478/pce-2018-0017.
- Naxera, V., Krčál, P.* (2018). „This is a controlled invasion“: The Czech president Miloš Zeman’s Populist Perception of Islam and Immigration as Security Threat. *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics*. 12(2). pp. 192–2015. DOI 10.2478/jnmlp-2018-0008.
- Pirozzi, N., Sandawi, S.* (2009). Military and Civilian ESDP Missions: Ever Growing and Effective? *Instituto Affari Internazionali*, available at: <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/IAI0929.pdf> (accessed 4.1.2015).
- Reus-smit, C.* (2009). Constructivism, in: Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-smit, C., True, J. *Theories of International Relations*. New York, Palgrave. pp. 188–212.
- Rodt, A. P.* (2011). Taking Stock of EU Military Conflict Management. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. 7 (1). pp. 41–60.

DATA CORPUS

- AP News. Available at: <https://www.apnews.com/0b9b211f2c784ab1a5f5bda0f38b0acb> (accessed 30.11.2018).
- About Hungary. Hungary to send more troops. Available at: <http://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/hungary-to-send-more-troops-fight-in-war-against-terror/Hungary-to-send-more-troops-to-fight-in-the-war-against-terror> (accessed 30.11.2018).
- About Hungary. Hungary to send more troops. Available at: <http://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/hungary-to-send-more-troops-fight-in-war-against-terror/Hungary-to-send-more-troops-to-fight-in-the-war-against-terror> (accessed 30.11.2018).
- Česká televize. Česko pomáhá v boji proti IS. Available at: <http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/1928384-cesko-pomaha-v-boji-proti-islamskemu-statu-po-vojenskych-expertech-vysle-i-lekare> (accessed 20.1.2019).
- Daily News Hungary. Hungary’s foreign minister US can continue rely Hungary fight terrorism. Available at: <https://dailynewshungary.com/hungarys-foreign-minister-us-can-continue-rely-hungary-fight-terrorism/> (accessed 20.11.2018).
- Defence Talk. Poland to send F16 jets. Available at: <http://www.defencetalk.com/poland-to-send-f-16-jets-soldiers-in-fight-against-isis-67663/> (accessed 25.5.2018).
- Fundacja Im. KazimierzaPułaskiego. New strategy in the fight against ISIS. What role for Poland. Available at: <https://pulaski.pl/en/new-strategy-in-the-fight-against-isis-what-role-for-poland/> (accessed 20.10.2018).
- Global Times. Slovakia not to send soldiers to fight against IS. Available at: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/885310.shtml> (accessed 30.11.2018).
- Jandová, Dominika.* Military involvement of Visegrad Four. *European Security Journal*. Available at: <https://www.esjnews.com/military-involvement-of-visegrad-four-in-foreign-missions> (accessed 11.7.2019).
- Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí a európskych záležitostí Slovenskej republiky. M. Lajčák na stretnutí Globálnej koalície proti Daíš: „Vojenské ťaženie musí ísť ruka v ruke s politickým procesom vedúcim k zmiereniu“. Available at: https://www.mzv.sk/aktuality/detail/-/asset_publisher/Iw1ppvnScIPx/content/m-lajcak-na-stretnuti-globalnej-koalicie-proti-dais-vojenske-tazenie-musi-ist-ruka-v-ruke-s-politickym-procesom-veducim-k-zmiereniu-/10182 (accessed 20.9.2018).

- Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí a európskych záležitostí Slovenskej republiky. M. Lajčák: Teroristov z Daiš' môžeme poraziť len spoločnými silami. Available at: https://www.mzv.sk/aktuality/detail/-/asset_publisher/Iw1ppvnScIPx/content/m-lajcak-teroristov-z-dais-mozeme-porazit-len-spolocnymi-silami/10182 (accessed 30.11.2018).
- Ministry of foreign affairs and trade. The threat of terrorism is a global phenomenon. Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/the-threat-of-terrorism-is-a-global-phenomenon> (accessed 29.11.2018).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. Deputy minister Rafal Trzaskowski. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/deputy_minister_rafal_trzaskowski_receives_delegation_of_us_congressmen (accessed 29.9.2018).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. Foreign minister attends meeting of the global coalition to counter ISIL in Washington. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/foreign_minister_attends_meeting_of_the_global_coalition_to_counter_isil_in_washington_d_c_ (accessed 25.5.2018).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. Poland must be part of fight against ISIL. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/they_wrote_about_us/minister_waszczykowski_poland_must_be_part_of_fight_against_isil_pap_dispatch_of_22_july;jsessionid=63CA0EC738FF7E11DF0D40748A0AB52D.cmsap1p (accessed 20.10.2018).
- Ministry of foreign affairs. Peter Szijjarto pledges increased and extended hungarian military participation in the fight against terrorism. Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/peter-szijjarto-pledges-increased-and-extended-hungarian-military-participation-in-the-fight-against-terrorism> (accessed 30.11.2018).
- Ministry of Human resources. Budapest declaration. Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-human-resources/news/budapest-declaration> (accessed 10.12.2018).
- Premiér Bohuslav Sobotka. Available at: <http://www.bohuslavsobotka.cz/proc-musi-evropa-pomahat-v-boji-proti-islamskemu-statu> (accessed 10.1.2019).
- Prime minister. Hungary can never fall again. Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/hungary-can-never-fall-again> (accessed 20.11.2018).
- Prime minister. Taking care of persecuted christians. Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/taking-care-of-persecuted-christians-is-a-natural-obligation-of-hungary> (accessed 15.11.2018).
- Spectator.sk. Slovakia considers aid to fight against ISIS. Available at: <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20052236/slovakia-considers-aid-to-fight-against-isis.html> (accessed 30.11.2018).
- Telegraph.co.uk. Who is in the anti Islamic State Coalition and what they are contributing. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11124070/Who-is-in-the-anti-Islamic-State-coalition-and-what-they-are-contributing.html> (accessed 20.10.2018).
- Telegraph.co.uk. Who is in the anti Islamic State Coalition and what they are contributing. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11124070/Who-is-in-the-anti-Islamic-State-coalition-and-what-they-are-contributing.html> (20.10.2018).
- The President of the Christian Democratic Party said at a press conference held before a public forum on the national consultation. Prime minister. Hungary can never fall again. Available at: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/hungary-can-never-fall-again> (accessed 20.11.2018).
- WBJ. Poland to send up to 210 troops to fight against ISIS. Available at: <http://wbj.pl/poland-to-send-up-to-210-troops-to-fight-against-isis/> (accessed 25.5.2018).

Страны Вишеградской группы на распутье между ЕС и НАТО : проблемы безопасности

Автор. Ханна Н. Главачкова – Ph.D., доцент Кафедры международных отношений и европейских исследований Метропольного университета (Прага). E-mail: hana.hlavackova@mup.cz

Аннотация. Государства Вишеградской группы (Чехия, Венгрия, Словакия и Польша) являются членами международных объединений, которые ведут борьбу с терроризмом. Их участие в решении данной проблемы является обязательным условием членства, однако их подходы отличаются. Несмотря на то, что Европейский союз создал ряд миссий по противодействию терроризму, страны В4 не принимают в них активного участия. В то же время «четверка» осуществляет деятельность в рамках антитеррористических миссий Североатлантического альянса. В данной статье автор применяет ролевую теорию для демонстрации места государств – членов В4 в структурах ЕС и НАТО. Вторая цель данного исследования – это выяснение причин их разноуровневой вовлеченности в борьбу с терроризмом в рамках ЕС и НАТО.

Ключевые слова: ЕС, НАТО, ролевая теория, терроризм, страны В4.